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CRAFTING A LICENSE TO KNOW FROM A PRIVILEGE 
TO ACCESS 
Jane K. Winn* 
Should the doctrine of trespass to chattels1 apply to unauthorized 
access to Internet facilities? If it does, then the property rights of the 
owners of computers connected to the Internet may be vindicated, but at 
a cost of diminished public access to information posted on the Internet. 
If it does not, then incentives to invest in the kind of commercial 
facilities that now largely constitute the Internet may be undermined, but 
the public interest in knowledge gleaned from information posted on the 
Internet will be protected. Although trespass to chattels has been derided 
as an anachronism ill-suited to the Internet,2 and its application to 
Internet activities rejected in some recent cases,3 other cases have held 
decisively that its application gives appropriate recognition to the rights 
of owners of computer equipment connected to the Internet.4 In order to 
                                                     
* Director and Professor, Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology, University of 
Washington School of Law. Thanks to William Edmundson, Brad Handler, and Jay Monahan for 
helpful comments. 
1. Trespass to chattels is defined as the unauthorized, intentional, and substantial use of or 
intermeddling with another’s tangible personal property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 217–218 (1965). 
2. “Trespass to chattels is somewhat arcane and suffers from desuetude.” Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). Many academic 
commentators have criticized the application of trespass to chattels doctrine to the Internet. See, e.g., 
Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000); Edward W. 
Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory in 
Cyberspace Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (2001); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On 
Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right To Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Dan 
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 
(2003); Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433 
(2003); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an 
Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping 
Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965 
(2000) [hereinafter O’Rourke, Shaping Competition]; Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of 
Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421 (2002). 
3. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003). 
4. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, 
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Some academic commentators 
have applauded this trend. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2003); 
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safeguard the “license to know” factual information posted to the 
Internet that the public currently enjoys, courts should recognize an 
individual privilege to access Internet resources in a reasonable manner. 
Given that trespass to chattels is unlikely to disappear from the 
Internet landscape any time soon, refinements are needed to keep the 
doctrine’s scope within reasonable bounds and to make its application 
more predictable. The California Supreme Court recently imposed such 
a limitation on its application by holding that liability for trespass should 
be found only if the Internet access at issue significantly impairs the 
functions of another’s computer equipment or, if widely replicated, 
would so impair it.5 However, this attempt to restrict the scope of earlier 
rulings may prove to be at least as contentious as the holdings of the 
cases it purports to limit, and so is unlikely to staunch the flow of 
controversy. 
The California Supreme Court focused on the functional impact that 
unauthorized access has on computer equipment owned by the party 
objecting to the access. A more helpful refinement of trespass doctrine 
might be found by considering instead which forms of access equipment 
owners have consented to merely as a consequence of connecting their 
equipment to the Internet. In every case in which trespass to chattels has 
been raised as an issue, before filing suit the equipment owner had 
demanded in no uncertain terms that the unauthorized access stop 
immediately, so the accessing party obviously cannot rely on a defense 
of express or implied consent. Courts could instead recognize a form of 
“constructive” consent to certain reasonable forms of access6 that would 
defeat a claim of trespass. While such a finding of “consent” would not 
correspond to the actual subjective state of mind of the plaintiff bringing 
a trespass to chattels claim, it would have the benefit of refocusing 
attention on the social significance of the public character of the Internet, 
and hold the owner of computer equipment connected to the Internet 
accountable for having made the choice to create that connection. 
                                                     
Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996); 
Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 VILL. L. REV. 117 
(2002); I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7 
(1996), at www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/hardy.html. 
5. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 296, 306. 
6. The California Supreme Court came close to doing this. Id. at 308 (“Intel connected its e-mail 
system to the Internet and permitted its employees to make use of this connection both for business 
and, to a reasonable extent, for their own purposes.”). 
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One of the most significant problems created by the application of 
trespass to chattels doctrine to unauthorized Internet access disputes is 
its overbreadth. Trespass doctrine lacks the nuances normally found in 
intellectual property law to balance competing public and private 
interests in the exploitation of ideas and knowledge. Overbroad grants of 
rights in information have a chilling effect on the progress of science and 
the dissemination of knowledge generally.7 Trespass doctrine vindicates 
the property rights of equipment owners at the expense of the “ease and 
openness of communication”8 that has always been the hallmark of the 
Internet. Overzealous application of trespass doctrine obscures the fact 
that some forms of Internet access must be privileged if the unique 
public character of the Internet is to be preserved. Such a privilege 
should be limited in scope in recognition of the role played by private 
parties in maintaining the Internet today. The recognition of this 
privilege, however, should not be made contingent on the voluntary 
acquiescence of private parties. 
Recognizing a defense to a claim of trespass in Internet cases based 
on a finding of constructive consent provides a doctrinal basis for 
privileging some forms of access while acknowledging a right to exclude 
certain other forms of access. Focusing attention on the public character 
of the Internet and assigning a clear legal significance to the equipment 
owner’s deliberate choice to participate in that arena provide a more 
secure legal foundation for such a privilege to access than the 
“functional impairment” standard offered by the California Supreme 
Court. The contours of such a doctrine of constructive consent to 
Internet access are suggested by the terms of the license eBay offered to 
Bidder’s Edge as discussed below—access by individual Internet users 
or its functional equivalent. This Article suggests that a defense based on 
constructive consent can complement the limitation imposed by the 
California Supreme Court to further limit the scope of trespass doctrine 
in Internet arenas, increase the predictability of the doctrine’s application 
in new disputes, and help to protect important public interests in free and 
open access to Internet resources. 
                                                     
7. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (arguing that an intellectual property right in data will be harmful to 
science and education if based on the labor expended in building the database instead of innovation 
contained in the data). 
8. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 311. 
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I. SETTING THE STAGE: EBAY, INC. V. BIDDER’S EDGE, INC. 
The first case to apply the doctrine of trespass to chattels to modern 
networked communication services involved the unauthorized use of 
access codes to make long distance calls.9 That case held that teenagers 
who hacked into a long-distance telephone service’s computer system 
and made unauthorized long distance calls using access codes thus 
obtained could be held liable for trespass to chattels.10 The chattels at 
issue were the telephone access codes; the court declined to limit the 
application of trespass to chattels doctrine to intangible interests that 
were clearly associated with an interest in tangible property.11 
The second case applying trespass to chattels to a modern networked 
communication system involved Cyber Promotions using the facilities of 
CompuServe, an Internet service provider (ISP), to send unsolicited 
commercial email (also known as spam) to the ISP’s subscribers.12 
CompuServe’s subscribers threatened to terminate their subscriptions 
unless it could stop Cyber Promotions from spamming them, and 
CompuServe undertook every technological measure at its disposal in a 
fruitless attempt to block Cyber Promotions’ communications.13 The 
court found that Cyber Promotions’ spamming constituted trespass to 
chattels, the chattels in question being CompuServe’s computer 
equipment, because the activity deprived CompuServe of the economic 
value of the equipment even though it did not lose possession of it.14 The 
court rejected the argument that Cyber Promotions’ access was 
privileged because CompuServe had consented to receive spam 
addressed to its subscribers, finding instead that whatever consent might 
be inferred from connecting its equipment to the Internet had been 
revoked by communications from CompuServe to Cyber Promotions.15 
Perhaps the most well-known case to apply the theory of trespass to 
chattels involved a conflict between eBay and Bidder’s Edge. eBay’s 
primary business involves providing an Internet auction service that 
permits individuals to offer items for sale and also to purchase items 
                                                     
9. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
10. Id. at 473. 
11. Id. at 473 n.6. 
12. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
13. Id. at 1019. 
14. Id. at 1022. 
15. Id. at 1024. 
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posted for sale.16 eBay’s business model focuses on creating a 
“community” of buyers and sellers; eBay does not itself offer for sale or 
guarantee any of the products offered on its site. Amazon.com and 
Yahoo! have similar auction sites, but eBay dominates the U.S. market 
for Internet auction services.17 These Internet auction sites are designed 
to give unrestricted access to individuals wishing to browse the items 
offered for sale. To place an item for sale, or to bid on an item, it is 
necessary to register with the auction site, and the registration process 
requires individuals to manifest their assent to the auction site’s terms 
and conditions of use. 
A. Auction Aggregators: Licensed and Unlicensed 
During the exuberant days of the dot com bubble, public interest in 
Internet auction sites such as eBay was exploding. A handful of dot com 
entrepreneurs devised the “auction aggregator” business model to permit 
individuals to search more than one Internet auction site simultaneously 
and to learn at once which site offered the best deal. There are no 
auction aggregators in operation today, but aggregators that once 
captured quite a bit of attention included www.auctionwatch.com, 
www.auctionferret.com, and www.auctionrover.com. 
Given that eBay was the dominant player in the U.S. Internet auction 
site then as well as now, it could be expected to have ambivalent feelings 
about aggregator sites. Aggregators might increase the liquidity of 
auction markets created by its competitors; however, to the extent that 
eBay offered the largest selection and best prices, comparisons might 
have only increased its advantage over its competitors. To the extent that 
eBay’s sellers would gain access to a larger group of prospective buyers 
through referrals from aggregators, however, they could be expected to 
support the work of the aggregator sites.  
Perhaps in order to accommodate the wishes of its sellers, eBay made 
a practice of licensing to aggregators access to information about 
auctions taking place on eBay’s site.  These licenses were granted 
subject to certain restrictions designed to minimize the demands placed 
on eBay’s own system by the aggregators, and to guarantee the accuracy 
                                                     
16. In 2000, eBay acquired Half.com, which provides a marketplace for buyers and sellers with 
fixed prices. In 2002, it acquired PayPal, the leading payment provider for Internet auction and 
consumer-to-consumer transactions. 
17. Troy Wolverton, At the Top of the Heap, eBay Still Must Look Down, THESTREET.COM, July 
24, 2003, at http://www.thestreet.com/pf/stocks/troywolverton/10101844.html. 
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of information being provided to aggregators’ customers.18 Aggregators 
were authorized to provide comparisons to aggregator site end users, 
provided that the demands they placed on eBay’s site were equivalent to 
the demands that would have been placed on its systems if aggregators’ 
customers had visited eBay’s site directly. In other words, eBay would 
only authorize aggregators to perform “real time proxy searches,” in 
which a query would be submitted for one item at a time, and the current 
price for that item would be provided to the aggregator’s end user 
immediately. This type of proxy search both limited the demands that 
aggregator sites placed on eBay’s servers and guaranteed that the 
aggregator’s end user was provided with updated, accurate price 
information. 
Many aggregators were willing to live within these constraints,19 but 
some, including Bidder’s Edge, were not.20 Bidder’s Edge’s business 
model involved sending software robots (bots) onto eBay’s site once 
every twenty-four hours to copy information about everything offered on 
the site. This information was sent back to Bidder’s Edge and displayed 
in response to Bidder’s Edge’s end users’ queries until another copy of 
all the listing information on eBay was made the following day. eBay 
objected both to the demands that the bots were placing on its system 
when copying all the listing information at once, and to the fact that 
Bidder’s Edge’s end users were often being shown inaccurate price 
information. When Bidder’s Edge’s end users clicked through an eBay 
listing only to find that the price had gone up since the Bidder’s Edge 
copy of the data had been made, some of them blamed eBay for the 
unexpected change in price. eBay was also concerned that Bidder’s 
Edge’s wholesale approach to collecting data off its site might cause 
eBay to fail to perform some of its undertakings under its privacy policy, 
and might make it possible for Bidder’s Edge to reuse information about 
“members” of the eBay community in ways that were expressly 
prohibited under the eBay User Agreement. 
                                                     
18. E-mail from Jay Monahan, Vice President, eBay, Inc., to author (Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
19. Steven Bonisteel, Auction Aggregator Gets OK To Search eBay, NEWSBYTES, Dec. 1, 1999, 
at http://www.exn.ca/Stories/1999/11/25/02.asp. 
20. Auction Conflict Escalates, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 11, 1999, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,31850,00.html; Steven Bonisteel, eBay’s Battle with 
Auction Aggregators Heats Up Again, NEWSBYTES, Nov. 4, 1999, at 
http://www.exn.ca/Stories/1999/11/04/01.asp. 
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eBay signaled its unwillingness to permit bots to trawl its site by 
using “robot exclusion headers.” Many Internet businesses that rely on 
information collected by bots to function, such as search engines, 
program their bots to abide by restrictions placed by web site operators 
in robot exclusion headers. Bidder’s Edge, by contrast, decided that it 
could ignore the content of eBay’s robot exclusion headers with 
impunity because the information it was collecting from eBay’s site was 
simply factual, and thus unlikely to be protected by copyright. In 
addition, because eBay’s business model dictated that as much 
information as possible should be made publicly accessible on its site, 
and only participation in actual purchases and sales should require 
registration and the formation of a contract with eBay, Bidder’s Edge 
could argue that the eBay User Agreement also did not apply. 
eBay and Bidder’s Edge entered into license negotiations that would 
have granted Bidder’s Edge permission to perform real time proxy 
searches on behalf of its end users, but the negotiations were broken off 
without agreement. eBay then began to use all technological means 
available to it at the time to block Bidder’s Edge’s bots from accessing 
its site, but without success. eBay next filed suit against Bidder’s Edge, 
seeking an injunction to prevent Bidder’s Edge from sending 
unauthorized bots onto eBay’s servers. The suit was based on various 
theories including trespass to chattels, false advertising, federal and state 
trademark dilution, computer fraud and abuse, unfair competition, 
misappropriation, interference with prospective economic advantage, 
and unjust enrichment. eBay was granted the injunction based on the 
trespass to chattels argument, but the court did not reach the other 
claims.21 Bidder’s Edge appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, but shut down its web site before the court heard oral 
arguments.22 Shortly thereafter, Bidder’s Edge paid eBay an undisclosed 
sum to settle the litigation.23 
While the outcome in the eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.24 case may 
have resolved the conflict between those two parties, the district court’s 
ruling established an overbroad precedent. The district court’s opinion 
does not place any limits on eBay’s power to restrict access to its site 
                                                     
21. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
22. Jahna Berry, Robots in the Hen House, THE RECORDER, July 24, 2001, at 
http://www.law.com/regionals/ca/stories/edt0723_ip_robots.shtml. 
23. Id. 
24. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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that eBay offered to Bidder’s Edge in the failed license negotiations. 
eBay was willing to grant Bidder’s Edge access to the information its 
customers wanted in a way that guaranteed that Bidder’s Edge’s 
customers were provided with only accurate price comparisons, but 
Bidder’s Edge rejected the offer because it thought it could do better 
without a license. 
B. Trespass to Chattels: Costs and Benefits 
Applying the doctrine of trespass to chattels to the problem of 
unauthorized access to Internet resources has several benefits. It 
recognizes that most of the facilities that make up the Internet are now 
owned and operated by private parties. These are not eleemosynary 
institutions, and it is not their intention to donate their computers to the 
public once they connect them to the Internet. The doctrine of trespass to 
chattels also can be invoked if someone merely “intermeddles” with a 
chattel, a concept that is sufficiently vague to be capable of expanding to 
cover access to Internet resources. It puts the owner of the computer 
equipment in the driver’s seat with regard to determining what access to 
its equipment is acceptable and what is not.25 In the absence of such a 
theory, owners of computer equipment would have to consider the 
consequences of connecting their equipment to the Internet much more 
carefully, and, in all likelihood, some businesses would make the 
decision to withdraw their systems from full participation in the Internet 
in order to maintain an acceptable level of control over their networks. 
These benefits notwithstanding, trespass to chattels fails to provide an 
adequate mechanism to balance the competing claims of Internet 
resource providers and Internet resource users. Asking whether an 
unauthorized electronic access to data stored in digital form on a server 
is equivalent to an unauthorized use of a toothbrush does not provide a 
rational basis for the development of the law in this area.26 The doctrine 
of trespass to chattels was considered archaic and underdeveloped before 
                                                     
25. See Epstein, supra note 4. 
26. The Restatement (Second) of Torts comments:  
There may, however, be situations in which the value to the owner of a particular type of 
chattel may be impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical 
condition. Thus, the use of a toothbrush by someone else may lead a person of ordinary 
sensibilities to regard the article as utterly incapable of further use by him, and the wearing of 
an intimate article of clothing may reasonably destroy its value in his eyes. In such a case, the 
intermeddling is actionable even though the physical condition of the chattel is not impaired. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. h (1965). 
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its sudden burst of fame in the Internet context, and its application to 
sophisticated computer technology is unlikely to produce profound 
insights into the character of social relationships mediated by technology 
and law. Unlike nuisance doctrine, it does not require the explicit 
balancing of the competing public and private interests affected by the 
regulation of Internet access, substituting a private, commercial 
decision-making process for a more public, participatory process 
characteristic of the Internet in its early days.27 
Perhaps the most appropriate theory for granting eBay the relief it 
sought against Bidder’s Edge, and in similar cases, might have been 
some kind of a reverse passing off28 “cold news” variation of the “hot 
news” misappropriation doctrine established in International News 
Service v. Associated Press.29 In International News, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a rival news service could not copy news stories and 
resell the information even though the news stories lacked copyright 
protection.30 The precise contours of misappropriation are somewhat 
unclear, but it seems at a minimum to grant a “quasi-property right” to 
the party claiming misappropriation, and to recognize the value of time 
and effort spent creating something of economic value that is not 
recognized by existing intellectual property law doctrines. 
Although the holding in that case has been limited to its facts by 
subsequent cases,31 those facts share a common characteristic with the 
facts of the eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. dispute because a large part 
of the economic value of the commercial information in both cases was 
determined by its “freshness.” In the eBay case, however, Bidder’s 
Edge’s behavior might have driven eBay’s customers away, not because 
they could get product of equal value from Bidder’s Edge, but because 
the Bidder’s Edge business model involved serving up eBay prices over 
eBay’s objection after they had become stale. Such a tenuous argument 
                                                     
27. See Burk, supra note 2. 
28. Reverse passing off is the marketing of another’s product under a claim that it is one’s own; 
passing off is marketing of one’s own product under another’s mark, i.e., trademark infringement. 
See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, __ n.1, 123 S. Ct. 2041, 
2045 n.1 (2003). 
29. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
30. Id. at 219. 
31. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997); Cheney 
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929); Nat’l Football League v. Delaware, 435 
F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1977); cf. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned To Repeat the Past: The 
Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual 
Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (1997). 
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would have been unlikely to support a claim for a preliminary 
injunction, however, leading eBay to emphasize its trespass claim as a 
more solid basis for a grant of an injunction. 
If the case had been decided on a misappropriation theory instead of a 
trespass theory, the court might have articulated limits to eBay’s 
discretion in deciding what type of access to grant visitors to its site. For 
example, the doctrine of misappropriation prohibits competitors from 
reusing information, but does not prohibit individuals in the general 
public from reusing the same information.32 A holding based on a 
misappropriation or deceptive trade practices theory might have 
distinguished between prohibiting certain forms of access arising out of 
unfair competition and preserving open access for other Internet users 
not engaged in any form of unfair competition. 
The controversy surrounding the appropriateness of applying trespass 
doctrine to Internet access disputes is unlikely to subside any time soon, 
nor is the inconsistency in the manner in which the doctrine has been 
applied likely to be eliminated soon. While it remains possible that 
Congress will act to resolve this turmoil by enacting legislation that 
balances the competing public and private interests fairly, it is unlikely 
that will happen in the near future. So both Internet site operators and 
visitors will likely be left struggling to make sense of the emerging 
jurisprudence of trespass to Internet facilities. Articulating more clearly 
the significance of the decision by the owner of computer equipment to 
connect it to the Internet may create a mechanism for establishing a 
better balance of public and private interests, thus diffusing some of the 
current controversy and providing greater predictability in the 
application of trespass doctrine. 
II.  A RIGHT TO EXCLUDE QUALIFIED BY A PRIVILEGE TO 
ACCESS 
The debate over whether trespass to chattels should be applied to 
resolve disputes involving unauthorized Internet access grows more 
acrimonious with passing time. On the one side are the “propertization” 
advocates, arguing that property rights of owners of the computer 
equipment at issue should trump other interests, giving the property 
owners a unilateral right to veto any use of their equipment they do not 
like.33 On the other side are the supporters of the idea of the Internet as 
                                                     
32. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236. 
33. See Epstein, supra note 4. 
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an open, public space where the community interest in preserving that 
openness conditions the right of owners of computer equipment to 
connect to the Internet on their acceptance of pre-existing Internet social 
norms of openness.34 
The degree to which the debate has become polarized is obvious from 
this comment by Justice Brown in her dissent in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi35: 
“Those who have contempt for grubby commerce and reverence for the 
rarified heights of intellectual discourse may applaud today’s decision, 
but even the flow of ideas will be curtailed if the right to exclude is 
denied.”36 But the debate need not be so polarized. The attempt to frame 
each position in absolute terms distorts each argument and obscures a 
possible middle ground where the competing claims of equipment owner 
and Internet end user might be harmonized. 
Recasting the arguments using Hohfeldian terminology of rights can 
help clarify this middle ground.37 Hohfeld suggested his system for 
classifying different forms of legal relations to show when apparent 
conflicts among different legal interests were misleading.38 In the case of 
unauthorized access to Internet sites, vindicating the property rights of 
equipment owners negates any possible right Internet site visitors might 
have to free and open access to information posted on the Internet. 
Vindicating the public interest in freely making use of information 
posted on the Internet negates any right of the equipment owner to 
exclude others from its equipment. While each side would like to claim a 
strong form of rights in support of its position, it may be more accurate 
to say that equipment owners have certain limited property rights 
bundled together with certain privileges and powers, while the end users 
clearly could also be found to have a privilege of access that the 
equipment owner must respect. Recasting the debate in these terms is 
merely a first step toward resolving the controversy, because even if 
equipment owners are prepared to concede that end users enjoy an 
                                                     
34. See Burk, supra note 2; Ruth L. Okediji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace: Information Markets 
and the Construction of Proprietary Rights, 44 B.C. L. REV. 545 (2003); O’Rourke, Shaping 
Competition, supra note 2. 
35. 71 P.3d 296, 325 (Cal. 2003) (J. Brown, dissenting). 
36. Id. at 325 (J. Brown, dissenting). 
37. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); see also WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
RIGHTS, ch. V, at 149 (Cambridge University Press ed., forthcoming 2004); Alon Harel, Theories of 
Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. 
Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., forthcoming 2004). 
38. Hohfeld, supra note 37, at 18. 
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implied license to access public Internet sites, the scope of that license 
remains to be defined. 
A. Right to Exclude 
Property rights in tangible computer equipment should not be 
conflated with a much broader right to exclude Internet users from 
accessing information on public web sites. If web site operators have a 
right to exclude end users, then end users have a corresponding duty not 
to interfere with the web site operator’s exercise of its right. This is 
because, using Hohfeld’s taxonomy, “duty” is the jural correlative of 
“right.”39 But assigning strong rights and correlative strict duties in this 
manner is at odds with the reality of Internet use by both web site 
operators and end users. Web site operators connect their systems to the 
Internet precisely in order to avail themselves of the public character of 
the network for commercial advantage. If web site operators are 
concerned about controlling access to their equipment, then such control 
can be accomplished by technological means—albeit at a cost of reduced 
traffic to a site.40 For example, eBay permits casual visitors to look at 
auctions without registering, but will only permit registered “members of 
its community” to actually participate in actions as buyers or sellers. In 
order to join the community, individuals are required to complete a 
series of web forms and click through a contracting interface, agreeing to 
be bound by eBay’s User Agreement. Registered users have user IDs 
and passwords that they must use to participate in auctions. User IDs and 
passwords with little or no verification of the information provided is a 
very rudimentary form of access control. If eBay required more security, 
it could use other networking technologies such as “virtual private 
networks.”41 
When commercial parties choose to connect their computer 
equipment to the Internet without restricting access to that equipment 
through the use of technological access controls, they are choosing to 
participate in a public forum. The Internet’s public character was 
                                                     
39. See EDMUNDSON, supra note 37, at 154; Hohfeld, supra note 37, at 30. 
40. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer 
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003) (statutes criminalizing unauthorized computer 
access should be interpreted as requiring the circumvention of a technological barrier to access 
rather than violating a contractual limitation on access). 
41. See, e.g., RITA C. SUMMERS, SECURE COMPUTING: THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS 353–58 
(1997). 
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established long before commercial exploitation of the Internet was 
permitted. Prior to 1995, the National Science Foundation Acceptable 
Use Policy (AUP) applied to Internet activity, and prohibited 
commercial use unless the National Science Foundation (NSF) reviewed 
the use for consistency with its overall mission and granted permission 
for it.42 At that time, the purpose of the Internet was “to support research 
and education in and among academic institutions in the U.S. by 
providing access to unique resources and the opportunity for 
collaborative work.”43 As Kesan and Shah explain: 
The NSFNET (later known as the Internet) connected 
universities, federal agencies, public and private research 
laboratories, and community networks. While the NSFNET 
encouraged such diversity, it also had an Acceptable Use Policy 
(AUP). The AUP prohibited the use of the NSFNET for 
purposes not in support of research and education, a policy 
consistent with the NSF’s mission. Nevertheless, a growing 
number of users wished to use NSFNET for purposes beyond 
research and education, a push for what the NSF termed 
“commercial use.” The potential for commercial use of the 
Internet propelled regional networks to create for-profit spin-
offs. These for-profit commercial networks would eventually 
form the basis for the privatized Internet backbone.44 
So the first commercial uses of the Internet were possible because the 
NSF granted immunity from expulsion to for-profit entities that joined 
the Internet. Under that immunity, the number of for-profit service 
providers grew until 1995, when the NSF was able to withdraw its 
support for the Internet backbone and turn it over to private parties to 
operate. 
Equipment owners that once accepted a mere immunity from 
expulsion in order to share in the benefits of Internet access are now 
trying to turn the tables on other Internet users and claim a right to 
exclude other Internet users at will. But this is too broad a claim of right: 
                                                     
42. National Science Foundation, Acceptable Use Policy (July 3, 1990), available at 
http://www.eff.org/Net_culture/Net_info/Technical/Policy/nsfnet_policy.old. 
43. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: 
What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain 
Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 112 (2001). 
44. Id. at 111 (citing BRIAN KAHIN, The NREN as Information Market: Dynamics of Public, 
Private, and Academic Publishing, in BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 323–24 (Brian 
Kahin ed., 1993)). 
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a narrower claim of right that recognizes a privilege of access for 
ordinary end users is adequate to protect the equipment owner from 
unfair competition and hostile intrusions to their equipment that interfere 
with their commercial activities. A narrower claim of right more fairly 
balances the interests of equipment owners and ordinary end users by 
permitting web site operators only to restrict access by other commercial 
parties, not access by individual end users. Some form of implied license 
for individual end users must be recognized to prevent the destruction of 
the open, public character of the Internet in the name of commerce. 
Granting web site operators a power to exclude other commercial 
actors from overbroad access to their sites, in lieu of a stronger right to 
exclude anyone from accessing their sites for any reason, assigns a 
realistic and appropriate significance to the equipment owner’s free 
choice to connect its equipment to an open, public communications 
medium. In Hohfeldian terms, to say that someone has a power is not to 
say that anyone else has a duty; rather, someone else might incur a duty 
if the power is exercised.45 Giving web site operators a power to fend off 
potential competitors permits them sufficient control over their 
equipment to protect its commercial value without depriving the general 
public of its ability to enjoy freely the open character of the Internet. If 
web site operators want to restrict access to their sites by the general 
public, then they can take concrete steps to restrict access to information 
on servers attached to the Internet, for example, by putting the 
information behind a firewall and implementing technological access 
controls. Many commercial web site operators, such as eBay, are 
unwilling to place these kinds of restrictions on casual visitors to its site, 
but do place these restrictions on anyone who would proceed from 
merely viewing information to transaction processing. The business 
decision regarding the design and implementation of access controls to 
Internet facilities should be assigned a legal significance in any 
subsequent dispute over whether a particular form of access was 
authorized. 
B. Right to Access 
Even the most vigorous opponents of the application of trespass to 
chattels to the issue of Internet access have not argued that Internet end 
                                                     
45. See EDMUNDSON, supra note 37, at 155. 
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users have a “right to access” Internet facilities.46 Such a strong claim 
would imply that equipment owners have a duty to maintain the 
equipment so that end users’ rights can be exercised.47 Instead, 
opponents argue that end users should receive a broad grant of immunity 
from liability as a consequence of the equipment owner having made the 
decision to connect to the Internet. In the eBay case, this immunity 
would have prevented eBay from getting an injunction to stop Bidder’s 
Edge’s bots from copying and transmitting large quantities of 
information accessible on eBay’s site before the court reached a 
judgment on the merits. 
A commercial entity such as Bidder’s Edge cannot claim that the type 
of access for which it demands immunity was an integral part of the 
public character of the Internet that eBay knowingly embraced. As early 
as 1994, a standard for robot exclusion was being developed informally 
to permit web site operators to communicate their desire to exclude 
software robots from their sites.48 Bidder’s Edge’s decision to send bots 
to copy and transmit data from eBay’s site for commercial exploitation 
on Bidder’s Edge’s site bears no resemblance to the types of access that 
would have been permitted under the NSF’s AUP. By contrast, the terms 
of the license that eBay offered Bidder’s Edge and that Bidder’s Edge 
rejected bore a close resemblance to the types of access that would have 
been permitted under the NSF’s AUP. Bidder’s Edge rejected eBay’s 
“reasonable access” license, however, and instead gambled on an 
aggressive claim that because it had the right to make unrestricted 
commercial use of the factual information on eBay’s computers, eBay 
had no right to restrict its access to eBay’s servers. 
C. Privilege to Access from Constructive Consent 
Consent may create a defense to a claim of tort liability by creating a 
privilege to engage in the conduct in question.49 An end user has a 
plausible claim that any web site operator who has not articulated an 
                                                     
46. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No. S103781), available at 
http://www.eff.org/Spam_cybersquatting_abuse/Spam/Intel_v_Hamidi/intel_v_hamidi_amicus.pdf; 
Burk, supra note 2; O’Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 2. 
47. “[Hamidi] does not argue that he has a right to force unwanted messages on Intel.” Intel Corp. 
v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 318 (Cal. 2003). 
48. See, e.g., Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion (Jun. 30, 1994), available at 
http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html. 
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 cmt. b (1965). 
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express policy governing access to its site has impliedly consented to 
any reasonable, conventional form of Internet access. However, this 
implied license alone cannot support the creation of a robust privilege of 
access for individual end users because a web site operator can revoke 
any implied consent at any time by notifying visitors that it has 
established a restrictive access policy. 
The only way to create a robust privilege of access for the general 
public is to find constructive consent to access web sites based on a web 
site operator’s choice to join the Internet without placing any functional 
restrictions on access to its site. Constructive consent is not a finding 
that consent exists as a factual matter, but rather is a legal fiction that 
asserts that something tantamount to consent does exist, and that it will 
be given the same legal effect as consent. While courts are often willing 
to find consent implied in light of parties’ behavior in a given context, 
they are generally reluctant to invoke the notion of constructive consent 
without an extraordinary justification.50 This general reluctance 
notwithstanding, a finding of constructive consent can be used to 
balance competing public policy objectives.51 Here, the competing 
policy objectives are the need to allow web site operators to protect 
themselves against interference, and the public’s need for open access to 
web sites. The notion of constructive consent shifts the obligation from 
the individual end user to ensure that his or her access is permitted to the 
web site operator to choose between granting the general public 
reasonable but unfettered access to its site and placing some form of 
functional access controls on its site. 
In order to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of 
individual end users in preserving the public character of the Internet 
and the interests of commercial web site operators in preserving and 
exploiting the value of the equipment they have connected to the 
Internet, the notion of constructive consent must be limited to those 
situations where the public interest in unrestricted access is clear. The 
NSF’s AUP provides a convenient starting point for the process of 
defining what “reasonable” individual access or its functional equivalent 
would be. But because AUP ceased to apply to Internet activities nearly 
a decade ago, it would be anachronistic to adhere too closely to its terms 
                                                     
50. See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2003); Griggs-
Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990). 
51. See, e.g., Murdza v. Zimmerman, 786 N.E.2d 440, 442–43 (2003). 
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in the search for a definition of access to Internet facilities so reasonable, 
it should always be privileged. 
Requiring a finding that machine functions were neither actually 
impaired nor likely to be impaired as a result of wide replication of the 
offending form of access, as the California Supreme Court did in 
Hamidi, is an important element in recognizing a privilege to access 
public Internet facilities, but by itself is not a complete protection for 
that privilege. The focus of a court’s analysis should be on the intent of 
commercial operators of computer equipment in making the decision to 
connect their facilities to the Internet, not on the impact that access has 
on machine functions. Focusing on intent and the social significance of 
the public character of the Internet creates a framework within which a 
privilege to access Internet resources can evolve with technological 
change while remaining consistent to its objectives. 
III. RECENT TRESPASS CASES 
The holdings of recent cases applying the doctrine of trespass to 
chattels to Internet access disputes veer from finding no privilege to 
access Internet sites to finding immunity from liability for clearly 
unauthorized access.52 If Internet facility operators, by connecting their 
equipment to the Internet without technological access controls, are 
deemed to have consented to the technological equivalent of individual 
access, can this notion of constructive consent help to make sense of 
recent trespass cases that otherwise seem to veer back and forth between 
contradictory interpretations? As the following analysis makes clear, the 
privilege of reasonable access for individual Internet users or its 
functional equivalent unfortunately is not a silver bullet that magically 
resolves all the overbreadth problems inherent in applying trespass to 
Internet access disputes. It may nevertheless help to focus attention on 
which characteristics of the Internet commercial parties should be 
required to tolerate, however grudgingly, as a condition of maintaining 
an open connection between their equipment and the Internet. 
                                                     
52. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding immunity from liability); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 
126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 
(N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 
1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (finding no privilege). 
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A. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. 
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc,53 a domain name registrar used 
trespass to chattels to stop unauthorized access to its site by a 
competitor. Although Register.com was required by its Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement (RAA) with the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to permit the use of domain 
name registration data for any lawful purpose, it was not permitted to 
allow the use of that data to enable the transmission of mass, unsolicited, 
commercial email (spam). Register.com worked with business partners 
to provide web hosting and other Internet services to its domain name 
registration customers. Verio, a provider of web hosting and other 
Internet services, used a software robot to collect information about 
recently registered domain names and then contacted the individuals 
who had registered them to offer them various Internet services. The 
manner in which Verio contacted Register.com customers was 
calculated to cause Register.com customers to believe Verio was, at a 
minimum, a business partner of Register.com when in fact it was a 
competitor. After Register.com learned, through complaints from its 
customers and business partners, that Verio was soliciting its customers 
in this manner, it demanded that Verio stop making such solicitations. 
When Verio would not agree to cease the solicitations, Register.com 
sought an injunction to stop Verio, pleading trespass to chattels, breach 
of contract, unfair competition, and unauthorized access under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The court issued a preliminary 
injunction based on a finding that Register.com was likely to prevail on 
both the trespass to chattels and computer fraud claims. 
The holding in Register.com has been controversial because the court 
did not require a showing that Verio’s unauthorized access was actually 
interfering with the functioning of Register.com’s equipment. Instead, 
the court accepted Register.com’s argument that if Verio was allowed to 
continue this type of unauthorized access, the floodgates would open and 
there would be no end to the other companies using the same technique 
to harvest data from Register.com’s system, at which point the 
functioning of its equipment would be impaired. 
If the court had used the constructive consent approach, the terms of 
the RAA, which required Register.com to provide public access to its 
data except under two limited circumstances, might have provided 
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evidence of what access Register.com could be deemed to have 
consented. Instead, because Verio had no rights as a third-party 
beneficiary under the RAA, the court rejected evidence that 
Register.com’s terms of use of its data were more restrictive than the 
RAA permitted.54 However, subsequent to the Register.com lawsuit, 
ICANN revised the terms of the RAA, requiring domain name registrars 
not to give access to data for “transmission by e-mail, telephone, or 
facsimile of mass, unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations to 
entities other than the data recipient’s own existing customers.”55 This 
revised RAA closely resembles the Register.com terms in effect at the 
time of Verio’s unauthorized access, indicating that Register.com’s 
terms of use were not unreasonable even if they did not conform to its 
obligations under the version of the RAA in effect at the time of the 
litigation. If the later standard of acceptable use of Register.com data 
was used as the standard by which constructive consent should be 
measured, then Verio’s conduct would not have been privileged after all. 
B. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.56 considered the application of 
trespass doctrine to the problem of one commercial site linking to 
another without permission.57 Ticketmaster is the largest company 
selling tickets to sporting and other entertainment events, and has both 
online and bricks-and-mortar operations; Tickets.com is one of its 
competitors, operating primarily online. Tickets.com provided visitors to 
its own web site information about events for which Ticketmaster was 
the exclusive sales agent by providing “deep links” into Ticketmaster’s 
web site. These deep links permitted Tickets.com’s visitors to avoid 
Ticketmaster’s home page and directly access information about a 
particular event located deep within Ticketmaster’s web site. In 2000, 
Ticketmaster unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to stop 
Tickets.com from providing deep links into its site, claiming breach of 
                                                     
54. Id. at 248 (stating that the RAA expressly provided that no third party beneficiaries would be 
created by its terms). 
55. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Registrar Accreditation Agreement 
(ICAAN RAA) § 3.3.5 (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-
17may01.htm. 
56. No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
57. Id. 
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contract, copyright infringement, trespass to chattels, false advertising, 
and trademark infringement.58 
In 2003, the same court granted summary judgment to Tickets.com on 
Ticketmaster’s trespass to chattels and copyright claims, but denied 
summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.59 Tickets.com sent 
a software robot onto the Ticketmaster web site to copy information 
about events, then discarded information such as logos, advertisements, 
and formatting, keeping only the factual information describing the 
events. The court rejected the idea that any unauthorized access by a 
software robot could give rise to liability for trespass when no 
impairment of the function of the equipment had been shown. 
The notion of constructive consent would point toward the same 
result here because hypertext is one of the defining characteristics of the 
World Wide Web. The court found that Ticketmaster had not shown that 
it had suffered any damages, such as loss of advertising revenues, as a 
result of the deep links created by Tickets.com. While the holding in the 
case was based on the inability of Ticketmaster to make out any trespass 
claim at all based on failure to prove the element of damages, the lack of 
damages also supports a finding that the access by Tickets.com through 
deep linking was the functional equivalent of reasonable access by an 
individual user. Ticketmaster wanted anyone interested in events for 
which it was the exclusive agent to access its site from its home page, 
but when the original dispute arose in 1999, it had not implemented any 
access controls that would have required individual visitors to follow 
such a route. 
C. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi 
In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, a disgruntled former employee used the 
Internet to criticize his erstwhile employer by sending emails to current 
Intel employees and by building a web site to disseminate his anti-Intel 
opinions on the World Wide Web.60 After someone provided him with 
an electronic copy of Intel’s employee directory, Hamidi sent emails on 
                                                     
58. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
59. Ticketmaster Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *2 (finding immunity from liability). In 
2000, the trial court found that Ticketmaster was unlikely to prevail on its breach of contract claim, 
but after additional discovery turned up new evidence that Tickets.com may have entered into a 
contract with Ticketmaster over the Internet the court in 2003 refused to enter summary judgment in 
favor of Tickets.com. 
60. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). 
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six occasions to anywhere from 8,000 to 35,000 employees, or a total of 
between 48,000 and 210,000 emails in all.61 Hamidi’s messages 
promised to remove recipients from the mailing list upon request, and he 
apparently complied with all such requests that he received.62 Intel, 
however, was unwilling to wait for its employees to make such requests 
or simply to delete Hamidi’s emails from their inboxes, and so 
demanded that Hamidi stop sending critical emails to its current 
employees.63 At trial and on appeal,64 Intel’s request for an injunction 
was granted based on a trespass to chattels theory, notwithstanding the 
lack of a showing of any significant impairment of Intel’s system’s 
functioning. The California Supreme Court took a different view of 
trespass doctrine, and held that because there was no significant 
impairment of Intel’s system’s functioning, and because there was no 
indication that a flood of other former disgruntled employees were 
waiting to deluge it with emails, Hamidi was immune from liability 
under trespass doctrine.65 
In determining whether Intel should be deemed to have consented to 
Hamidi’s use of its equipment to send emails to its current employees, 
notwithstanding its vociferous objections, a crucial factor would seem to 
be the non-commercial character of Hamidi’s communication. Although 
the California Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether 
enforcement of a state law that interfered with Hamidi’s exercise of his 
free speech rights would constitute impermissible state action under the 
First Amendment, unlike the Register.com and Ticketmaster cases, 
Hamidi was not a competitor of Intel, and his behavior did not raise 
unfair competition issues. On the other hand, if constructive consent 
creates a privilege for reasonable individual access of Internet facilities, 
it is unclear whether sending 48,000 to 210,000 emails constitutes 
reasonable individual use. A final factor suggesting that Intel should be 
deemed to have constructively consented to Hamidi’s sending emails to 
its current employees is its failure to implement more effective and 
restrictive access controls. By granting its employees relatively free 
access to the Internet, Intel arguably entered into a public arena within 
                                                     
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 
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which it could be expected to tolerate the criticism of ex-employees such 
as Hamidi, at least in the absence of any showing that Hamidi’s 
communications were impairing the function of its systems. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The public character of the Internet can be protected by assigning a 
legal significance to decisions by commercial Internet users about how 
to make use of Internet technologies. Individual users of the Internet 
should have a license to access what is posted on the Internet that cannot 
be negated by arbitrary assertions of rights over information rooted in 
ownership of tangible computer equipment. Because the free flow of 
information has been a hallmark both of civil society and the Internet, 
that association between civil liberties and the institutional character of 
the Internet should be preserved notwithstanding the growing 
commercialization of Internet resources. Granting individual users a 
privilege to access information on the Internet in a reasonable manner 
would preserve the basic character of that association while still 
recognizing that the Internet is now sustained by private investment in 
computer equipment. Access by anyone other than individuals in a 
manner that approximated individual access would likewise be covered 
by an implied license created by constructive consent, but consent to 
access that differs in quality or quantity from that associated with 
individual users could be withdrawn. This license to access information 
would be in effect a privilege implied by law that limits the property 
rights of the owners of the equipment. Using the common law to 
articulate the scope of constructive consent to access by Internet users, 
and the privilege it creates, would help to clarify the social significance 
of the Internet itself and establish viable standards to safeguard its open, 
participatory character. 
